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Who am I? The Self/Subject according to  
Psychoanalytic Theory. 
 
Alex Watson 
 
`But now I'm not sure who I 
am. I use this word “I” and I 
don't know what it means. I 
don't  know  where  it  begins 
and ends. I don't even know 
what it's made of.' 
The End of Mr. Y (Thomas, 2007: 278). 
Introduction 
There  have  been  several  attempts  since  Freud  to  introduce  into 
psychoanalytic theory concepts of `the self' and `the subject'.  This 
essay argues that these attempts are neither necessary, nor helpful, 
nor true to Freud's intentions.  Freud himself hardly used the terms 
`self' or `subject', and when he did he certainly did not intend them 
as technical terms.   
 
In America it was Kohut who began talking of the self as a `psychic 
structure' (1971: xv), `a content of the mental apparatus' (p. xv) 
with a `psychic location' (p. xv).  In England Winnicott introduced 
the idea of a `true self' linking it with the id.  Guntrip depicts the 
evolution of psychoanalytic theory as consisting of four stages be-
fore it was able to reach its highpoint as `a theory of the ego as a 
real personal self' (1968: 127).  Bollas and Khan have taken on from 
Winnicott the idea of the self as an entity, though they differentiate 
themselves from Winnicott in the following ways.  For Bollas the true 
self consists not only of the id, but also the ego, since the latter 
contains  the  `organizing  idiom'  and  the  `factor  of  personality' 
(1987: 8), both of which, for him, form part of the constitution of 
the self.  He regards the `true self' as `the historical kernel of the 
infant's instinctual and ego dispositions' (p. 51).  Khan dislikes the  
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adjective  `true'  in  Winnicott's  phrase  (and  he  accuses  Guntrip  of 
falling  into  the  `danger  of  romanticization  of  a  pure-self  system' 
[1996: 304]), but `the self' is a theme throughout his writing, and 
he regards self-experience as `more than can be accounted for by 
our structural hypotheses' (1996: 304).  The bulk of this essay will 
consist  of  demonstrating  how  such  theoretical  directions  run 
counter to Freud's intentions and represent a return to an earlier, 
more narcissistic mode of thinking from which Freud enabled us to 
free ourselves. 
 
Freud 
Before  Freud  the  vast  majority  of  European  philosophers  – f r o m  
Plato and Aristotle to Kant and Descartes – regarded human beings 
as having an essence, to which they gave the name `soul' or `self'.  
The main characteristic of this supposed entity, apart from it consti-
tuting our `core', was that it was `the subject'.  The meaning of the 
word subject here is connected to its grammatical meaning as when 
we say `the subject of the sentence', the thing which carries out 
the action denoted by the verb.  The self was regarded as the sub-
ject of both our mental and our physical actions, i.e. the thinker of 
our thoughts, experiencer of our experiences, perceiver of our per-
ceptions, feeler of our feelings, as well as the initiator of our physical 
actions, the agent.  Combined with these two characteristics of be-
ing the essence and being a subject was the idea of being unitary, 
single, undivided over time.  Thus the self can always be referred to 
by the word `I' even when the latter features in such diverse con-
texts as moral judgements, inner sensations, sense-perceptions, in-
tentions  or  physical  actions  (`I  deem  that  irresponsible';  `I  feel  a 
pain'; `I heard a bang'; `I plan to retreat'; `I kicked the ball'.) 
 
It was part of the genius of Freud that he was able to see through 
this concept.  He did not accept the existence of any single entity 
that could be put forward as an answer to the question `Who am I' 
or `What am I'?  We neither are nor contain anything that remains 
identical over time.  Even at one moment of time we are not one 
thing.  Rather we are a multiplicity of interacting systems and proc-
esses. 
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Topographical Model 
Freud's breaking up of the unity of the person begins with his earli-
est writings on hysteria.  For his hysterical patients seemed both to 
know, yet also to not know, certain things.   
 
Thus Freud writes of Elisabeth von R.'s love for her brother-in-law: 
`With regard to these feelings she was in the peculiar situation of 
knowing and at the same time not knowing' (1895b: 165).  And in 
his discussion of Lucy R., he recounts the following.  He had asked 
her why, if she knew she loved her employer, she had not told Freud.  
She replied: `I didn't know—or rather I didn't want to know. I wanted 
to drive it out of my head and not think of it again; and I believe lat-
terly I have succeeded' (1895a: 117). 
 
How could one entity both know and not know something?  Freud's 
solution was to divide us into consciousness and an unconscious.1  
The unconscious of the patients in question `knew', but censorship 
prevented this information from passing into their consciousness. 
 
What we are dealing with here is not something particular to neurot-
ics,  but  a  fundamental  plurality  of  human  subjectivity.    That  it  is 
characteristic of everyone is evidenced by, for example, dreaming.  
The following footnote, added by Freud in 1919 to `The Interpreta-
tion of Dreams', illustrates how dreaming cannot be explained if we 
envisage ourselves as a unity: 
 
No doubt a wish-fulfilment must bring pleasure; but the ques-
tion then arises `To whom?'.  To the person who has the wish 
of course.  But, as we know, a dreamer's relation to his wishes 
is quite a peculiar one.  He repudiates them and censors them – 
he has no liking for them, in short.  So that their fulfilment will 
give  him  no  pleasure,  but  just  the  opposite;  and  experience 
shows that this opposite appears in the form of anxiety, a fact 
                                         
1 Strictly speaking, of course, it is a triple division into that which is un-
conscious (i.e. completely unavailable to consciousness), preconscious (i.e. 
potentially available) and conscious (i.e. completely available).  
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which has still to be explained.  Thus a dreamer in relation to 
his dream-wishes can only be compared to an amalgamation of 
two separate people who are linked by some important com-
mon element (1900: 580–581). 
 
It makes no sense to ask what in all this is the subject, the self.  The 
dreamer?  But if that were the case then it would be the dreamer 
that had the wish, so its fulfilment would give him/her pleasure.  The 
dreamer's experience of anxiety in the face of the wish-fulfilment in-
dicates that we must ascribe the wish to some other agency, an ag-
ency that wishes for things that the dreamer does not.  The situa-
tion can only be satisfactorily explained on the assumption of two 
different agencies, one that wishes and the other that resists this 
wish. 
 
To choose one of these two as the self would be arbitrary.  But to 
claim that they are both the self would be contradictory; the very 
concept of selfhood implies a unity that does not allow for opposed 
agencies.  As Freud implies, we are dealing here with an irreducible 
plurality, comparable only to `an amalgamation of two separate peo-
ple'.   
 
Structural Model 
Thus far we have been looking at the destruction of the concept of 
`self'  or  `subject'  that  results  from  Freud's  topographical  model.  
The structural model suggests the same result.  Though we may pre-
reflectively appear as a unity, we can only be satisfactorily repre-
sented as a plurality of the three agencies of id, ego and superego. 
 
Ego = Self/Subject? 
One of the constituents of the structural model, the ego, may look 
as though it can be equated with `self' or `subject': is that not im-
plied by the fact that the literal meaning of the German term, das Ich, 
is `the I'?  But Freud's elaboration of the concept of the ego clearly 
precludes such an equation.  It is true that the ego is the subject of 
consciousness, but Freud's point is that the subject of conscious-
ness,  far  from  constituting  our  core,  is  a  marginal  agency  at  the  
  5 
 
outer surface of the mind, occasionally able to influence the expres-
sion of the id's instincts, but often not.  If anything occupies a cent-
ral position it is the id: on one occasion, Freud describes it as `the 
core of our being' (1938: 196).  The ego, by comparison, is marginal 
and impotent, and thus very unlike a `self' or an autonomous agent, 
for two reasons. 
 
1) Lack of Power. 
Whereas the idea of a self is of something from whose orders all ac-
tions  proceed,  the  ego  enjoys  no  such  autonomy:  `it  is  not  even 
master in its own house' (1917a: 285), i.e. within the sphere of the 
mind.  It may order the id to behave in a way that it deems desir-
able, but `the life of our sexual instincts cannot be wholly tamed' 
(1917b: 143).  The influence it can exert is lamentably small com-
pared to the idea of a self as sole agent.  Freud envisages the mind 
as a hierarchy of agencies (1917b: 141).  The `highest' agency, the 
ego, initiates a chain of commands; but at any of the many stages 
before the command is carried out, it may be met with refusal.  It is 
as though the owner of a newspaper tells the editor what he wants 
to  be  written,  the  editor  tells  the  writer, t h e  wri t e r wri t e s  i t ,  b ut  
then someone at the printing press does not like it so refuses to 
print it (my comparison not Freud's).   
 
The  limit  of  the  ego's  power  can  also  be  seen  on  the  level  of 
thought: it does not decide what thoughts arise, when they arise, 
and neither can it order them away once they have arisen: 
 
Thoughts emerge suddenly without one's knowing where they 
come from, nor can one do anything to drive them away. These 
alien guests even seem to be more powerful than those which 
are  at  the  ego's  command.  They  resist  all  the  well-proved 
measures of enforcement used by the will, remain unmoved by 
logical refutation, and are unaffected by the contradictory as-
sertions of reality (1917b: 141–142). 
 
Freud  mentions  disowned  impulses  that  feel  foreign  to  the  ego, 
which the ego fears, takes precautions against, yet feels paralyzed  
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by.  Psychoanalysis, he says, speaks thus to such an ego (1917b: 
142): 
 
You over-estimated your strength when you thought you could 
treat your sexual instincts as you liked and could utterly ignore 
their intentions. The result is that they have rebelled and have 
taken their own obscure paths to escape this suppression; they 
have established their rights in a manner you cannot approve. 
 
So here too the ego is portrayed as quite unable to defend against 
rebellions on the part of the id. 
 
2) Lack of Knowledge. 
Whereas a self is characterized as aware of all of our thoughts and 
feelings,  the  ego  `must  content  itself  with  scanty  information  of 
what is going on unconsciously in its mind' (1917a: 285).  The re-
ports available to it are neither complete nor always accurate.  Con-
sciousness has access only to a small fraction of the mind's current 
activities.    Rhetorically  addressing  the  ego,  Freud  writes  (1917b: 
142–143): 
 
You feel sure that you are informed of all that goes on in your 
mind if it is of any importance at all, because in that case, you 
believe, your consciousness gives you news of it. And if you 
have had no information of something in your mind you confi-
dently assume that it does not exist there. Indeed, you go so 
far as to regard what is “mental” as identical with what is “con-
scious” – that is, with what is known to you – in spite of the 
most obvious evidence that a great deal more must constantly 
be  going  on  in  your  mind  than  can  be  known  to  your  con-
sciousness. Come, let yourself be taught something on this one 
point! What is in your mind does not coincide with what you are 
conscious of; whether something is going on in your mind and 
whether you hear of it, are two different things. In the ordinary 
way, I will admit, the intelligence which reaches your conscious-
ness is enough for your needs; and you may cherish the illusion 
that you learn of all the more important things. But in some 
cases, as in that of an instinctual conflict such as I have de- 
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scribed,  your  intelligence  service  breaks  down  and  your  will 
then extends no further than your knowledge. In every case, 
however, the news that reaches your consciousness is incom-
plete and often not to be relied on. Often enough, too, it hap-
pens that you get news of events only when they are over and 
when you can no longer do anything to change them. Even if 
you are not ill, who can tell all that is stirring in your mind of 
which you know nothing or are falsely informed? You behave 
like an absolute ruler who is content with the information sup-
plied  him  by  his  highest  officials  and  never  goes  among  the 
people to hear their voice. 
 
It is thus inappropriate to equate the ego with the self because not 
only does it have at best intermittent control over the id, it also has 
only partial knowledge of the contents of its own mind.2 
 
Freud aligned himself on this point with Copernicus and Darwin.  The 
former undermined the narcissism that regarded man's planet as the 
centre of the universe; the latter undermined the narcissism that set 
man apart from animals as God's favourite creature.  But Freud pre-
dicted that `human megalomania' would suffer its `most wounding 
blow' from psychoanalysis' contention that the ego is not even su-
preme within its own mind (1917a: 285; 1917b: 139–143). 
 
Id = Self/Subject?   
Could the id be characterized as our `self'?  Is this not suggested by 
Freud's remark about the id being the `core of our being'?  But to 
describe the id as the `self', given that it departs so far from the 
usual  connotations  of  the  concept  of  a  self,  would  be  at  best 
counter-intuitive and at worst meaningless.  The id is not the subject 
                                         
2 Two  o t he r co ns i de ra t i o ns  ma k e  t he  e g o  uns ui t a b l e  f o r b e i ng  e qua t e d 
with the self: 1) A part of it is unconscious.  In Freud’s early writings the ego 
was held to be co-extensive with consciousness; but in his 1923 essay, ‘The 
Ego and the Id’, he expressed his realization that resistance, though proceed-
ing from the ego, is unconscious (see, e.g., pp. 16–18).  Thus he had to ac-
cept that the ego is not wholly conscious.  2) The ego itself can be split and 
divided against itself: see (in the context of fetishism) Freud (1915: 189).  
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of consciousness.  It can neither know itself, nor make itself known, 
depending  for  that  on  the  ego:  it  `is  accessible  even  to  our  own 
knowledge  only  through  the  medium  of  another  agency'  (Freud 
1938: 196).  It is not the part of us that is capable of reason, nor 
that which perceives the external world.  
 
Neither is it unitary, but rather a plurality of instincts differentiated 
from each other because of being associated with different organs 
(1938:  197).    These  various  instincts  are  often  opposed  to  each 
other,  moreover,  some  being  predominantly  infused  with  Eros  and 
some with destructiveness (1938: 196). 
 
Thus Freud's intention was not, having removed selfhood and sub-
jectivity from the ego, to rehabilitate them in the id.  Rather he re-
garded them as suspect concepts, to be done away with altogether.  
It was simply narcissism that gave rise to them and sustains them, 
with  their  implications  of  autonomy  and  unity  (1917a:  284–285; 
1917b: 139–143).  
 
Besides, to select just one out of three things would be arbitrary and 
too restricted, given that it is the combination of the three that is 
supposed to represent the workings of our mind. 
 
Id + Ego + Superego = Self/Subject? 
In  that  case  how  about  characterizing  the  conglomeration  of  all 
three as the `self' or `subject'?  The problem with this move is that 
the  conglomeration  would  only  be  misleadingly  characterized  by 
those  terms.    The  three  constituents  lack  sufficient  compatibility 
and mutual coherence to be capturable by these concepts that sug-
gest unity.  The id and the ego do not share common goals (pleasure 
v's safety), do not function according to the same principles (pleas-
ure principle v's reality principle).  In fact the id can threaten the 
very existence of the ego: though it cannot do away with it alto-
gether,  it  can  shatter  its  carefully  built-up  structure  or  change  it 
back into a portion of the id.3  Freud describes the id as an enemy of 
                                         
3 See Freud (1938: 199):  
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the ego, and one that is harder to defend against than an external 
enemy.  One can flee from an external enemy, but the id is always by 
the side of the ego; even if it can be temporarily held down, it con-
tinues to issue threats from that position.4   
 
The ego is similarly antagonistic and antipathetic to the id.  The im-
pulses emerging from the id seek to actualize themselves but they 
are obstructed by the ego, which, if it does not approve of them, 
`ruthlessly' inhibits them.5 
 
If ego and id were portrayed by Freud as companions functioning co-
operatively to achieve a common purpose, they could more easily be 
                                                                                                                    
The ego, which seeks to maintain itself in an environment of 
overwhelming  mechanical  forces,  is  threatened  by  dangers 
which come in the first instance from external reality; but dan-
gers do not threaten it from there alone. Its own id is a source 
of similar dangers, and that for two different reasons. In the 
first place, an excessive strength of instinct can damage the 
ego in a similar way to an excessive ‘stimulus’ from the external 
world. It is true that the former cannot destroy it; but it can 
destroy its characteristic dynamic organization and change the 
ego back into a portion of the id. 
4 See Freud (1938: 200): 
It adopts the same methods of defence against both, but its 
defence against the internal enemy is particularly inadequate. 
As a result of having originally been identical with this latter 
enemy and of having lived with it since on the most intimate 
terms, it has great difficulty in escaping from the internal dan-
gers. They persist as threats, even if they can be temporarily 
held down. 
5 See Freud (1917b: 141): 
Somewhere in the nucleus of his ego he has developed an or-
gan of observation to keep a watch on his impulses and actions 
and see whether they harmonize with its demands. If they do 
not, they are ruthlessly inhibited and withdrawn.  
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subsumed under a unitary whole, but they are depicted as mutually 
antagonistic and independent. 
 
At this point the reader may respond: But surely the three of them 
are three constituents of something; they constitute a larger whole.  
This larger whole may be heterogeneous, but what is the harm in 
talking of a heterogeneous or divided `self' or `subject'?  Why can-
not a single thing contain within itself opposing tendencies? 
  
1) To speak of one thing containing ego, id and superego implies the 
existence  of  some  entity  that  exists  over  and  above  these  three.  
But there is no extra entity to which the three belong: the mind is 
nothing other than the plurality of these three.   
 
2)  If  we  want  some  term  for  the  three  of  them  together,  let  us 
either  use  some  new  concept  other  than  the  self  or  the  subject, 
which does not contain the shortcomings of those, or let us stick 
with what Freud himself uses here – terms such as the mind, the 
psyche.  These are non-technical terms.  Other non-technical terms 
are harmless, such as `the person' or `the individual'.  Psychoanaly-
sis does not need to suggest that such terms are eliminated from 
language; but it should remember that for Freud 1) they were not 
`scientific', and 2) when that which they designate is analyzed `sci-
entifically' (1917a: 284, 285; 1917b: 139, 142), it is revealed as a 
plurality of three antagonistic and independent systems or agencies. 
 
Ogden 
I hope to have shown by now that those who speak of the self as an 
entity, such as the authors mentioned in the introduction, are theo-
rizing in a way that is neither necessary nor true to Freud's inten-
tions.6  Og de n' s  po s i t i o n ( 1992a ,  1992b )  i s  mo re  subtle,  for  two 
reasons.    He  deliberately  avoids  the  use  of  the  term  `self',  being 
                                         
6 Of course a much more lengthy study than this would be required to ex-
amine what benefits these authors derive from, for example, the distinction 
between  a  true  self  and  a  false  self,  and  to  propose  ways  in  which  these 
benefits can be retained even without resorting to such terminology.  
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suspicious of its `static, reifying meanings' (1992a: 522).  Secondly, 
he  uses  the  term  `subject'  not  to  refer  to  a  fixed  entity  but  to 
something that is `dialectically constituted'.  In case it seems, there-
fore, that his position is little different from that argued for here, 
the rest of the essay will be taken up with a critique of it. 
 
Ogden's two articles (1992a, 1992b) on what he terms the `dialec-
tically constituted/decentred subject of psychoanalysis' can be ana-
lyzed as consisting of two strands.  In one, he masterfully decon-
structs the concept of `the subject' through a selection of positions 
advocated by Freud, Klein and Winnicott.  Each of these three he 
depicts as having in different ways undermined the concept of a uni-
tary subject: Freud through his divisions of the mind into 1) con-
sciousness and the unconscious, and 2) id, ego and superego; Klein 
and Winnicott through their emphasis on an intersubjective context 
as a necessary requirement for a sense of individual subjectivity.7 
 
But having deconstructed `the subject', Ogden then reconstructs it 
in the second strand.  Having shown that the subject is neither con-
sciousness nor the dynamic unconscious, he then argues that it is 
`constituted' by `the dialectical interplay' between the two (1992a: 
518).  Having replaced it with id, ego and superego, and shown it to 
be represented by none of these taken singly, he then reconstitutes 
it as the `discourse of' the three (1992a: 520).  A concept that has 
been  shown  to  be  redundant  thus  becomes  resuscitated.    What 
would, according to the reasoning both of this essay and of Ogden's 
first strand, preferably remain decomposed becomes recomposed. 
 
Ogden's  preoccupation  with  the  question  of  the  `location  of  the 
subject' (1992a, 1992b: passim) reveals a belief that the subject 
must be located somewhere.  But this belief is only valid if we remain 
committed to the view that a subject exists.  When Ogden writes 
that `The subject for Freud is to be sought in the phenomenology 
corresponding to that which lies in the relations between [his italics] 
                                         
7 On the dependence of subjectivity on intersubjectivity, see also Crossley 
(1996), especially chapter 3: `Imagination, Self and Other: On Egological In-
tersubjectivity', pp. 49–72.  
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consciousness and unconsciousness' (1992a: 519), it is not surpriz-
ing that he supplies no reference to Freud's writings: I doubt if one 
could be found where Freud states that `the subject is to sought' 
anywhere.  The sentence reveals Ogden's assumption that the sub-
ject must be sought.  But if it is an illusion, why does it need to be 
sought? 
 
Having not found it to be equivalent to ego, id or superego, he sees 
it as constituted out of the interplay of these three.  But Freud's 
concern, I hope by now to have shown, is to undermine the idea of a 
single  subject.  So  to  say  `the s u b j e c t  i s  X '  i s  n o t  b e i n g  t r u e  t o  
Freud's intentions, whatever referent we supply for X. 
 
Ogden provides an incisive account of the way in which the subject 
has been decentred, dethroned, dispersed, but he then cannot resist 
the urge to re-instate it.  A sign that he is not being true to Freud is 
his  claim  (1992a:  517)  that  a  `central',  `irreducible  element'  of 
psychoanalysis is Freud's `conception of the subject'.  Yet, as he 
himself admits (1992a: 517), Freud hardly used the term `subject'.  
It is perhaps in order to address this seeming inconsistency that he 
asserts, `Despite the central importance of this theme, it remained a 
largely  implicit  one  in  Freud's  writing'  (1992a:  517).    But  if  the 
theme was not addressed explicitly by Freud, in what sense is it of 
central importance?  Thus I regard as highly dubious his claim that in 
Freud's writing one can `discern the creation of a new conceptual 
entity: the psychoanalytic subject' (1992a: 517).  The concept of 
the `psychoanalytic subject' should rather be viewed as an invention 
of Ogden's.  
 
Some may want to counter that Ogden's position is not significantly 
different from that proposed here, in that both claim the subject to 
be nothing other than ego, id and superego (or consciousness, pre-
conscious and unconscious).  The difference lies in the interpretation 
of the words `nothing other than'.  When a physicist says that `heat 
is nothing other than movement of molecules', he is not proposing that 
heat is an illusion.  He is proposing the reduction of heat to some-
thing more fundamental, but not the elimination of the concept of 
heat.  Indeed the validity of the concept of heat is safeguarded by  
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the fact that it can easily be translated into the more fundamental 
level  of  molecule-movement.    But  when  a  sceptic  says  that  `the 
ghost in the garden is nothing other than the play of light and shadow 
and rustling of leaves', he is proposing that the ghost is an illusion.  
He is proposing not the reduction of the concept of ghosts to some-
thing else, but its elimination.  Ogden's view of the relationship of 
`the subject' to ego, id and superego is equivalent to that of heat 
and  molecule-movement;  mine  is  equivalent  to  ghosts  and  light, 
shadow and rustling. 
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